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Four recent decisions in the Federal courts,' as well as an ex-
cellent article in this JOURNAL, 2 have cohsidered various aspects
of the difficult question of the extent of the exemption of the sala-
ries of state and municipal employees from the federal income
tax. Many other articles 3 have had as their texts the related
question of the exemption of the interest on state and municipal
bonds from the same tax. In view of this mass, of literature, an
examination of the decisions and of their implications may well
seem to be threshing old straw. But there has been no authorita-
tive determination of the principal issue to be considered, and this
decision, when made, will have many important incidental effects,
which perhaps have not as yet been fully presented.
For the sake of clarity, this article will be confined to a consid-
eration of the liability to federal income tax of the salaries or
wages of officers or employees of states or municipalities. The
related question of the liability of the state or municipality itself
to federal tax upon income received by it from utilities will be dis-
cussed only in relation to the former problem.
The starting point for any discussion of a federal income tax
question is, of course, the Sixteenth Amendment. 4 It provides:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on in-
comes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration."
On the face of it, the amendment appears to give Congress the
power to levy an income tax upon any sort of income regardless
of its source. While the proposed amendment was being con-
1Metcalf v. Mitchell (1926) 46 Sup. Ct. 172; Frey v. Woodworth (1924,
E. D. Mich.) 2 Fed. (2d) 725, dismissed in Supreme Court on motion of
Solicitor General, (1926) 46 Sup. Ct. 347; City of Seattle v. Poe (1925,
W. D. Wash.) 4 Fed. (2d) 276; Lyons v. Reinecke (1926, C. C. A. 7th)
10 Fed. (2d) 3.
2 Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State
Taxation of Federal Activities (1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 807.
3Among others, see Corwin, Constitutional Tax Exemptions (1924) 13
NAT'L MUNICIPAL REv. 51; Anderson, The Problem of Tax-Exempt Securi-
ties (1924) 8 MINN. L. REV. 273; T. R. Powell, The Sixteenth Amendment
and Income from State Securities, THE NATIONAL INCOME TAX MAGAZINE,
July 1923.
'Proclaimed by the Secretary of State to have been ratified by the
requisite number of states on February 25, 1913.
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sidered by the legislatures of the several states, there was much
discussion as to whether it would give Congress the power to levy
an income tax upon the interest upon state and municipal bonds,
or upon the salaries of state officials.G Various governors urged
or opposed ratification upon the ground that such items of income
might be taxedP The immediate cause of the amendment had
been the decisions in the PollockI cases,- that a tax upon certain
kinds of income was unconstitutional in view of the sources of
such income and of the failure to apportion the tax. Among the
kinds of income under consideration had been interest from mu-
nicipal and state bonds. It was accordingly argued that the
amendment was intended to put at rest any contention that the
source of an item of income must be examined in determining
whether it could be taxed. This construction of the amendment,
though eminently plausible, has apparently been rejected by the
Supreme Court in a series of well-known dicta,s culminating in
the decision of Evans v. Gore.0 Perhaps the most complete state-
ment of the court's interpretation in this respect occurs in Mr.
Chief Justice White's opinion in Stantoa v,. Bal.tic Mi11ing Co. :1o
"But aside from the obvious error of the proposition intrin-
sically considered, it manifestly disregards the fact that by the
previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth
Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but simply pro-
hibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxa-
tion possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken
out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently be-
longed and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject
to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from v:hich the
income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was
-a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the
origin or source of the income taxed. Mlark, of course, in saying
this we are not here considering a tax not within the provisions
of the Sixteenth Amendment, that is, one in which the regulation
of apportionment or the rule of uniformity is wholly negligible
because the tax is one entirely beyond the scope of the taxing
See, for example, Foster, Icome Tax (1914) 78 et scq.; Minor, The
Proposed Iizcome Tax Amendment (1910) 15 VA. L. REG. 737, 753; Hub-
bard, The Sixteenth Amendwent (1920) 33 H,%v. L. REv. 794; Graves,
Inherent Improprieties in the Income Tax Anzdnzent to the Fcdcral Con-
stitution (1910) 19 YALE LAW JOURN,%L, 505y 528.
6 For a collection of such expressions, see Cornin, op. cit. mpra note 3;
Anderson, op. cit. supra note 3.
Polloet v. Farmers' Loan & Trus=t Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup.
Ct. 673; 158 U. S. 601, 15 Sup. Ct. 912.
s See Bnshaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 1 at 17, 18
and 19, 36 Sup. Ct. 236 at 241 and 242; Stanton z,. Baltic Mining Co. (1916)
240 U. S. 103, 112, 36 Sup. Ct. 278, 281; Eisgnr 2,. Maaomber (1920) 252
U. S. 189, 204, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 192; Peel, i. Lozc (1918) 247 U. S. 165,
3S Sup. Ct. 432.
9 (1920) 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup. Ct. 550.
13 Supra note 8 at 112, 36 Sup. Ct. at 281.
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power of Congress and where consequently no authority to im-
pose a burden either direct or indirect exists."
Likewise in Evans v. Gore, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking
for the majority, said :11
"True, Governor Hughes, of New York, in a message laying the
Amendment before the legislature of that State for ratification or
rejection, expressed some apprehension lest it might be con-
strued as extending the taxing power to income not taxable be-
fore; but his message promptly brought forth from statesmen
who participated in proposing the Amendment such convincing
expositions of its purpose, as here stated, that the apprehension
was effectively dispelled and ratification followed.
"Thus the genesis and words of the Amendment unite in show-
ing that it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted
subjects, but merely removes all occasion otherwise existing for
an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income,
whether derived from one source or another. And we have so held
in other cases."
The soundness of the court's interpretation has been elabor-
ately considered by other writers, 2 some of whom have further
upheld the thesis that the court has never actually decided whether
the interest on state and municipal securities or the salaries of
state officials is subject to the federal income tax."1 It is reason-
ably clear, however, that whether its expressions are dicta or
decisions, the court has come to the conclusion, thoughtfully con-
sidered, that if these items of income were not taxable by the
federal government before 1913, they are not taxable after.
Whatever exemption there is, however, rests not upon any ex-
press provision of the constitution, but upon constitutional impli-
cations. To determine its scope, then, it is necessary to review
briefly the prior decisions of the Supreme Court defining the
nature of the exemption.
II
The classic case upon the subject of the intergovernmental re-
lations of the states and the nation for tax purposes is McCulloch
v. Maryland.'4  The general outline of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion therein is so well known to lawyers that it is only nec-
essary to focus attention upon a few features of it which are
peculiarly pertinent to this discussion. In the first place, the
tax involved was a state stamp tax upon the note issue of the
Bank of the United States; the tax applied to note issues of banks
operating in the state and not chartered by the legislature. In
other words, the tax was obviously discriminatory; it was evi-
3. Supra, note 9 at 261, 40 Sup. Ct. at 556.
12 See, for example, Rottschaefer, Federal Taxation of "Exempt" Incomc
(1924) 8 MINN. L. Rav. 112; Corwin, op. cit. supra note 3.
23 See particularly Professor Corwin's article supra note 3.
.4 (1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
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dently the particular manifestation by the Maryland legislature
of a desire prevailing in the several states to drive the Bank out
of business.15 In the second place, it is evident that, on these
facts, the decision involved only the state power to tax and not
the federal power. The famous ex\'pression "That the power to
tax involves the power to destroy" 10 was not used in respect of
the powers of the federal government. Indeed Mr. Chief Justice
M1arshall expressly indicated that there need be no such fear of
a destructive exercise of its taxing powers by the national gov-
ernment.1 7  It cannot fairly be said, then, that Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall held that "to safeguard our constitutional system, there-
fore, the right of taxation by the one sovereignty upon any power
of the other must be wholly denied." 1
The leading case upon the power of Congress to levy an income
13 See 4 Beveridge, The Life of Joh, Marshall (1919) ch. VI; 1 Warren,
The Supreme Court in United States HIN-tory (1922) 504 et seq.
'2 "But, waiving this theory for the present, let us resume the inquiry,
whether this power can be exercised by the respective States, consistently
with a fair construction of the constitution?
"That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power
to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there
is a plain repugnance, in conferring on one government a power to control
the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to thoZe
very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control,
are propositions not to be denied. ." McCulloch v. Maryland, mpra
note 14 at 430.
17 "It has also been insisted, that, as the power of taxation in the general
and State governments is acknowledged to be concurrent, every argument
which would sustain the right of the general government to tax banhs
chartered by the States, will equally sustain the rights of the States to
tax banks chartered by the general government.
"But the two cases are not on the same reason. The people of all the
States have created the general government, and have conferred upon it
the general power of taxation. The people of all the States, and the States
themselves, are represented in Congress, and, by their representatives,
exercise this power. When they tax the chartered institutions of the
States, they tax their constituents; and these taxes must be uniform.
But, when a State taxes the operations of the government of the United
States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but
by people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures
of a government created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit
of others in common with themselves. The difference is that which al-
ways exists, and always must exist, between the action of the whole on a
part, and the action of a part on the whole-between the laws of a govern-
ment declared to be supreme, and those of a government which, when in
opposition to those laws, is not supreme." McCzlloch v. Maryland, s, pra
note 14 at 435.
Is Cohen and Dayton, op. cit. supra note 2 at 812-3. Cf. the statement at
807-8: "Ever since the decision in McCulloch v. Maryland it has been
laid down as a general rule that each government, and by that term was
comprehended the political subdivisions of each as well, was free from
any burden of taxation attempted to be imposed by the other."
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tax upon the salaries of state officials is Collector v. Day,0 which
involved the question whether the salary of a state judge was
subject to tax under the Civil War income tax acts. Mr. Justice
Nelson said in part :20
"It is admitted that there is no express provision in the Con-
stitution that prohibits the general government from taxing the
means and instrumentalities of the States, nor is there any pro-
hibiting the States from taxing the means and instrumentalities
of that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon nec-
essary implications, and is upheld by the great law of self-preser-
vation; as any government, whose means employed in conducting
its operations, if subject to the control of another and distinct
government, can exist only at the mercy of that government."
"* * * the means and instrumentalities employed for
carrying on the operations of their governments, for preserving
their existence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties as-
signed to them in the Constitution, should be left free and unim-
paired, should not be liable to be crippled, much less defeated by
the taxing power of another government."
If it be regarded as settled, then, that the Sixteenth Amendment
did not extend the taxing powers of Congress to sources of income
previously exempt, it appears that the "means and instrumental-
ities employed for carrying on the operations of their [the
states'] governments, for preserving their existence, and ful-
filling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the
Cbnstitution" are not subject to the federal income tax. The
next question is whether all enterprises in which a state or a
municipalitr may engage are embraced within .the phrase, and
whether all individuals receiving income from such enterprises
are exempt in respect of it from federal taxation.
The most recent authoritative judicial expression is that of
Mr. Justice Stone in Metcalf v. Mitchell.21 The question con-
sidered was the liability to income tax of amounts received by
consulting engineers as compensation for their services under
contracts with various states, municipalities, or water or sewage
districts created by state statute. The court held such com-
pensation taxable. The reasoning is that the extent of the ex-
emption claimed depends upon (1) the effect of the tax upon the
government alleged to be burdened,22 and (2) the nature of the
10 (1871) 11 Wall. 113.
20 Collector v. Day, supra note 19 at 127 and 125.
21Supra note 1.
2 Metcalf v. Mitchell, supra note 1 at 174: "As cases arise, lying be-
tween the two extremes, it becomes necessary to draw the line which
separates those activities having some relation to government, which are
nevertheless subject to taxation, from those which are immune. Experi-
ence has shown that there is no formula by which that line may be plotted
with precision in advance. But recourse may be had to the reason upon
which the rule rests, and which must be the guiding principle to control
its operation. Its origir was due to the essential requirement of our con-
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governmental agencies.- It is a clear inference from the opin-
ion, if not its ex-pression, that various enterprises of the state
may be subject to federal taxation; the court cites for this proposi-
tion with approval the South Carolina liquor case" and Flint v.
Stone-Tracy Co.,2- which will be discussed below. The further
strong inference is that a non-discriminatory income tax upon
individuals receiving compensation from the state, who are not
officers or employees of government, may not be deemed an in-
terference in any substantial way with the state government.
This aspect of the case will be further considered under III below.
Since the engineers in the particular case held no official posi-
tions, were free to accept other employment, and did not show
that their duties were defined or prescribed by statute, the court
concluded that they were not officers or employees of the stateP2
stitutional system that the federal government must exercise its authority
within the territorial limits of the states; and it rests on the conviction
that each government, in order that it may administer its affairs within
its own sphere, must be left free from undue interference by the other.
McCulloch v. Maryland, supra; Collector v. Day, supra; Commsioncrs of
Erie County, supra.
"While it is evident that in one aspect the extent of the exemption must
finally depend upon the effect of the tax upon the functions of the govern-
ment alleged to be affected by it, still the nature of the governmental
agencies or the mode of their constitution may not be disregarded in pass-
ing on the question of tax exemption; for it is obvious that an agency may
be of such a character or so intimately connected with the exercice of a
power or the performance of a duty by the one government, that any taxa-
tion of it by the other would be such a direct interference with the func-
tions of government itself as to be plainly beyond the taxing power."
23Metcalf v. Mitchell, su:pra note 1 at 175: "It is on the principle that,
as we have seen, any taxation of one government of the salary of an officer
of the other, or the public securities of the other, or an agency created and
controlled by the other, exclusively to enable it to perforn a go-.ernmental
function (Gillespie v. O1"ahoma, supra), is prohibited. But here the tax
is imposed on the income of one who is neither an officer nor an crployc2
of government and whose only relation to it is that of contract, under
which there is an obligation to furnish service, for practical purposzez not
unlike a contract to sell and deliver a commodity. The tax is imposc.d
without discrimination upon income whether derived from service3 rendered
to the state or services rendered to private individuals. In such a situa-
tion it cannot be said that the tax is imposed upon an agency of govern-
ment in any technical sense, and the tax itself cannot be deemed to be an
interference with government, or an impairment of the eifficieicy of its
agencies in any substantial way. Railroad Co. v. Peniston; Gromer v.
Standard Dredging Co.; Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore; Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania; Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R. Co. v. M5achey,
supra!'
2-4 South. Carolinw v. United States (1905) 109 U. S. 437, 2G Sup. Ct. 110.
25 (1910) 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342.
- The Treasury had held that "in order to be an officer or employee it
must appear that the duties performed by such person are of a continuous
nature and are not occasional, temporary, or specific in character or object."
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within the meaning of the statutory exemption;2 that there was
no constitutional prohibition against taxing them.
It appears, then, that the Supreme Court has concluded that
officers and employees of states and municipalities are exempt
from the federal income tax ;2 but that not all who receive com-
pensation from the state or city are within the exemption. In
the taxable category are, according to the Metcalf case, individ-
uals who hold no regular official position in the state or munici-
pality. That case further calls attention to the non-exempt state
enterprises defined in the South Carolina liquor case and in
Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co. To complete this study of the scope
of the federal power to tax incomes derived from states or mu-
nicipalities, it is necessary to examine these earlier decisions.
In South Carolina v. United States2 the court passed upon the
power of the United States to collect license taxes from dealers
selling liquor in dispensaries established by the state, whose
profits belonged to the state. The court, in upholding the tax,
said in part:30
"There is something of a conflict between the full power of the
Nation in respect to taxation and the exemption of the State from
Federal taxation in respect to its property and a discharge of
all its functions. * * * The exemption of the State's prop-
erty and its functions from Federal taxation is implied from the
dual character of our Federal system and the necessity of pre-
serving the State in all its efficiency. In order to determine to
what extent that implication will go we must turn to the condi-
tion of things at the time the Constitution was framed. * * *
Looking, therefore, at the Constitution in the light of the condi-
tions surrounding at the time of its adoption, it is obvious that
the framers in granting full power over license taxes to the
National Government meant that that power should be complete,
and never thought that the States by extending their functions
could practically destroy it . ..
"It is also worthy of remark that the cases in which the in-
validity of a Federal tax has been affirmed were those in which
the tax was attempted to be levied upon property belonging to
the State, or one of its municipalities, or was a charge upon the
means and instrumentalities employed by the State, in the dis-
charge of its ordinary functions as a government ...
"These decisions, while not controlling the question before us,
indicate that the thought has been that the exeniption of State
agencies and instrumentalities from national taxation is limited
to those'which are of a strictly governmental character, and does
(1921) Sol. Op. 122, 5 Int. Rev. Cum Bull. 108. This test is severely
criticized in a note in (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 793 at 797.
27 Contained in sec. 201 (a) of the Revenue Act of Oct. 3, 1917 (40 Stat.
at L. 303), but not repeated in succeeding acts.
28 To the same effect is (1919) 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 441, and Art. 88 of
1S. Treas. Reg. 62 and 65.
2o Supra note 24.
30 Supra note 24 at 456, 26 Sup. Ct. at 114.
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not extend to those which are used by the State in the carrying
on of an ordizary private business. [Italics mine.] . . .
"It is reasonable to hold that while the former may do nothing
by taxation in any form to prevent the full discharge by the
latter of its governmental functions, yet whenever a State en-
gages in a business which is of a private nature that business is
not withdrawn from the taxing power of the Nation."
There are similar expressions in Salt Lake City v. Hollister.,
where a city engaged in distilling spirits was held to be subject
to internal revenue taxation under the laws of the United States.
In Flinit v. St ne-Tracy Co.2- the court considered the applica-
tion of the corporation excise tax act of 1909 to so-called public-
service companies. The court said, in part:33
"It is no part of the essential governmental functions of a
State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial light,
water, and the like. These objects are often accomplished
through the medium of private corporations, and, though the
public may derive a benefit from such operations, the companies
carrying on such enterprises are, nevertheless, private companies,
whose business is prosecuted for private emolument and advan-
tage. For the purpose of taxation they stand upon the same foot-
ing as other private corporations upon which special franchises
have been conferred.
"The true distinction is between the attempted taxation of those
operations of the States essential to the execution of its govern-
mental functions, and which the State can only do itself, and
those activities which are of a private character. The former,
the United States may not interfere with by taxing the agencies
of the State in carrying out its purposes; the latter, although
regulated by the state, and exercising delegated authority, such
as the right of eminent domain, are not removed from the field
of legitimate Federal taxation."
These decisions are uniform, then, in dividing the activities of
a city or state into two classes for purposes of federal taxation-
proprietary and governmental; the first group is a proper object
of federal taxation, 4 the latter is not. It is hardly a matter of
31 (1886) 118 U. S. 256, 6 Sup. Ct. 1055.
=
2Supra note 25.
33 Supra note 25 at 172, 31 Sup. Ct. at 357.
34 The Treasury has so ruled with respect to the income tax upon the
compensation of individuals working for a municipal street railway in
(1923) Sol. Op. 152, Int. Rev. Cur. Bull., 11-2, p. 93. Messrs. Cohen and
Dayton suggest, op. cit. supra note 2 at 809, 810, that the test laid down
in this opinion is "the distinction which has grown up in determining the
tort liability of the public bodies to individuals." A careful reading of the
opinion indicates, however, that it is based on the distinction for federal
tax purposes between various activities of the state and municipalities as
drawn in Souvt Carolina v. United States, supra. note 24; Bank of United
States v. Planters' Bank (1824) 9 Wheat. 904; Salt Lakc City v. HollMer,
supra note 31; Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., supra, note 25; and Via.I v.
Manila (1911) 220 U. S. 345, 31 Sup. Ct. 416. The tort distinction is
referred to, but does not appear to be made controlling.
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present importance that Mr. Justice White dissented in the South
Carolina case; that case has never been overruled, and is expressly
approved by the unanimous court in Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co.
and in the recent Metcalf case. For similar reasons, the South
Carolina case cannot be disposed of as standing alone, and resting
upon a peculiar state of facts,35 for the Supreme Court has ap-
plied the same distinction in at least four succeeding cases.".
Moreover, it is hardly convincing to argue that the distinction
in the tort field between governmental and proprietary activities,
is elusive and illogical; that consequently any such distinction in
the field of taxation is likewise illogical' The tort distinction
apparently is founded on special grounds not at all applicable to
taxation, probably particularly on the ground of the peculiar
hardship to an individual negligently injured to have no redresa
against a responsible defendant. It may well be, as has been
urged,3 8 that one negligently injured by a government employee
or officer should uniformly be given the power to sue the govern-
ment. But how does this conclusion bear upon the income tax
liability of the government employee? The Supreme Court does
not rely upon the tort cases as establishing any distinction in the
field of taxation; they are referred to in the South Carolina case,
but the decision rests upon the much broader grounds already
referred to-that a state by engaging in a private business, does
not thereby remove that business from the field of non-discrim-
inatory federal taxes imposed upon all such businesses.
III
Although there is an abundance of authority for distinguishing
for federal tax purposes between the proprietary activities of the
state and its governmental functions, there are no decisions by
the Supreme Court specifically applying this distinction to the'
income tax upon the compensation of its officers and employees.
Should the court hold, then, that although a state judge is not
taxable upon his salary, a motorman, employed by a municipally
owned street railway, is?
The decisions already referred to certainly appear to point to
that conclusion. If, as was said in Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., "it
is no part of the essential governmental functions of a State to
provide means of *transportation, supply artificial light, water
and the like," -39 the reason given for the exemption of the salary
35 Cohen and Dayton, op. cit. supra note 2 at 820.
36 Salt Lake City v. Hollister, supra note 31; Vilas v. Manila, supra note
34; Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., supra note 25; Metcalf v. Mitchell, supra
note 1.
, See Cohen and Dayton, op. cit. supra note 2 at 810.
3s See Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924-5) 34 YALE LAW;
JOURNAL 1, 129, 229.
39 Supra note 25 at 172, 31 Sup. Ct. at 357.
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of the state judge in Collector v. Day"° does not apply to the case
of the motorman. For, on this premise, "the means and instru-
mentalities employed for carrying on the operations of their gov-
ernments" are not being affected by the tax. Or if, as was held
in the South Carolin&al case, a federal license tax may properly
be imposed upon state-employed dispensers of intoxicating liquors,
the tax being in fact paid by the state, there can hardly be any
constitutional objection to the imposition of the federal income
tax upon the salary received by the dispenser, the tax being in
fact paid out of his own pocket. Or, to use the language of
Metcalf v. Mitchell, a federal income tax, which "is imposed with-
out discrimination upon income whether derived from services
rendered to the state, or services rendered to private individuals"
may be collected from "one who is neither an officer nor an em-
ployee of government," since "in such a situation it cannot be
said that the tax is imposed upon an agency of government in
any technical sense, and the tax itself cannot be deemed to be an
interference with government, or an impairment of the efficiency
of its agencies in any substantial way." '2
At this point, it should perhaps be emphasized that it is con-
fused analysis to consider the federal tax upon income accruing
to the state from a state enterprise as being analogous to the
federal tax upon income accruing to an individual employee, or
that the two taxes stand or fall by virtue of the same arguments.
Since Uited States v. Baltmore & Ohio R. R. Co.," it may be
questioned whether the state's income can be taxed; at any rate,
Congress has been sedulous in exempting it." Such a tax would
be a very obvious and direct drain upon the state revenues in
favor of the federal government. But the tax upon the compen-
sation of an employee of some proprietary enterprise of the state
in no sense falls upon the state. The state is in no way handi-
capped in bargaining for employees against private employers.
In many cases of state-owned businesses, the business was ac-
quired from private ownership. The employee's compensation
remains the same, if the tax is imposed upon his salary, that it
was before. If an exemption is granted, his compensation is in
substance increased to that extent. To that extent, the state
40 Supra note 19.
41 Supra note 24.
-1 Supra note 1 at 175.
43 (1873) 17 Wall. 322.
44 See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, See. IIG(a) (38 Stat. at L. 172); Act of Sept.
8, 1916, Sec. 11 (b) (39 Stat. at L. 767) ; and Rev. Acts of 1918, 1921, 1924
and 1926, Sees. 213(b) (7).
The wording of the first paragraph of the exemption provision in all
the acts---"Income derived from any public utility or (from) the exercise
of any essential governmental function . . ." etc.-itself indicate3 that
Congress had in mind the distinction here insisted upon, that between
essential governmental activities, and proprietary activities.
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employee is being favored over the private employee performing
the same service.
Since the decision of the question will evidently turn upon the
actual effect upon the state of the grant or the refusal of the
exemption, it is not irrelevant to consider the difference in setting
between the day of McCulloch v. Maryland and today. At that
time, the phrase "the power to tax involves the power to destroy"
had a very real meaning-the states were actively engaged in
attempting to destroy the United States Bank, as well as to
weaken the authority of the federal government. In the face
of the increasing co-operation, between the federal and state
governments at the present time, it could hardly be contended
that either is attempting or would attempt to destroy the other
by discriminatory taxation. Again, the levy of the federal in-
come tax upon the wages of an employee of a state-owned busi-
ness enterprise is not, as has been urged, an attempt by the fed-
eral government to discourage state experiments in business.41
It is conceived that such a levy is justified, not only that the state
enterprise may be given no unfair advantage in competition with
private enterprise of the same sort, but also that the mass of
income taxpayers of the United States, not employed by states
or cities, may not be called upon to make up by a corresponding
increase in their taxes, the amount of taxes which otherwise
would be collectible from the state employees, and to that extent
to subsidize the business venture of the state. It can scarcely
be urged, as a practical proposition, that the prospective or actual
levy of a federal income tax on the wages of a motorman of the
Detroit Street Railway will have any possible discouraging effect
upon the city's undertaking such an enterprise. On the other
hand, why should a motorman of the Detroit Street Railway be
exempted from a tax which the motorman of the privately owned
Chicago Street Railway is compelled to pay?
Students of federal revenue legislation have noticed, as a re-
curring phenomenon, the increase in the exemptions granted by
the acts. The evils of exemptions are reasonably obvious. In
the first place, the exemption of any particular class of taxpayers
or of income necessarily requires that the remaining classes of
taxpayers and of income bear a burden heavier by so much.
4r Messrs. Cohen and Dayton, op. cit. supra note 1 at 832 apparently
concede this as their final conclusion: "Neither does it seem that the
question of municipal ownership or control of public utilities is as closely
bound up with this question of tax exemption as is generally assumed."
The opening paragraphs of their discussion sound a somewhat different
note: "Yet implicit in the problem of that case Frey V. Woodworth,
supre note 1 are questions the final answer to which may well change
the whole course of our municipal development and activities, and may
even be a vital factor in the discard or retention of the political philosophy
upon which our government was founded and by which until recent years
it has largely been guided."
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Again, the administration of the law is considerably complicated
by the necessity of ruling upon the qualifications of a steadily in-
creasing number of applicants for the different sorts of exemp-
tions. No doubt either of these objections is outweighed by the
meritorious claims of such well-known exemptions as educational
institutions or charities. But for the reasons shown, the claims
of the particular group of taxpayers here involved for special
privileges do not seem particularly strong.
For these reasons, it is to be regretted that Congress inserted
into the Revenue Act of 1926 the provision :r
"Any taxes imposed by the Revenue Act of 1924 or prior rev-
enue acts upon any individual in respect of amounts received by
him' as compensation for personal services as an officer or em-
ployee of any State or political subdivision thereof (except to the
extent that such compensation is paid by the United States Gov-
ernment directly or indirectly), shall, subject to the statutory
period of limitations properly applicable thereto, be abated, cred-
ited, or refunded."
With the Supreme Court about to decide the constitutional que.-
tion involved, with the Treasury committed to the collection of
the tax and having collected it, there seems to be no sound reason
why these taxpayers should be the recipients of a special refund,
to which, 'so far as one can determine from earlier decisions, they
are not entitled. Moreover, it will be observed that this lan-
guage does not make it clear that an officer or employee of a
state-owned private enterprise is exempt from federal income
tax, either in 1924 and preceding years, or today. The Treasury
has previously ruled that such individuals are not officers or
employees of the State for the purposes of this exemption.47 If
the Treasury's previous view were adopted, the question in Fcy
v. Woodworth--whether the compensation of an employee of
the Detroit Street Railway for 1923 is subject to the federal in-
come tax--would still be unsettled.2 So far as taxation under
the 1926 act is concerned, the question seems to remain wholly
open. In other words, Congress gave no assistance in the solution
of the problem here considered; it merely added the new hurdle
of an ambiguously drawn statutory provision to the other ob-
stacles in the course. But perhaps it is fortunate that the e:-
emption is no clearer. All the reasons cited against a judicially
determined exemption apply with equal force against a legislative
exemption.
4C Sec. 1211.
4 Supra note 34.
48 Supra note 1.
Is The case was, however, dismissed on motion of the Solicitor General,
(1926) 46 Sup. Ct. 347, following the passage of the 192G Act, evidently
on the theory that the particular employee of the street railway was an
employee of the municipality within the meaning of section 1211.
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The final question is, assuming that persons employed in the
proprietary activities of the State are taxable by the federal
government upon their incomes, where is the line to be drawn
separating the proprietary from the governmental activities. No
doubt it will be difficult to draw any line at all in many cases;
but that difficulty is hardly an argument against making the dis-
tinction. As Mr. Justice Holmes has said :50
"Neither are we troubled by the question where to draw the
line. That is the question in pretty much everything worth
arguing in the law."
There are at least two possibilities. Following Mr. Justice
Nelson's language," the governmental activities of the State may
be considered to be merely the historically essential governmental
activities. It seems to be a well recognized rule that exemptions
should be strictly construed. On such a basis, the salaries of
officers or employees of a municipally-owned water system,"2 or
of a port district,53 of a state employment agency, or of a state-
50 Irvin v. Gavit (1925) 268 U. S. 161, 168, 45 Sup. Ct. 475, 476. See
also his similar language in his dissent in Schlesinger v. State of Wisconsin
(1926) 46 Sup. Ct. 260, 262.
51 Quoted supra, p. 960.
'5 See (1924) Sol. Mem. Op. 2232, Int. Rev. Cum. Bull. 111-2, p. 83.
Frey v. Woodworth, supra note 1, involved the question whether the com-
pensation of officers and employees of the municipally-owned Detroit Street
Railway was subject to the federal income tax. The district court, al-
though fully recognizing the distinction between the governmental and
proprietary activities of the state, held that these salaries were not tax-
able, evidently on the ground that the operation of a street railway was a
governmental function. The court relied on United States v. King County,
Wash. (1922, C. C. A. 9th) 281 Fed. 686, holding that a county operating
a ferry need not collect and pay over the federal transportation tax. Aside
from the difference in the incidence and methods of collection of the two
taxes, the cases seem readily distinguishable on the ground that while the
maintenance of highways, bridges, or even ferries may be a proper govern-
mental function, the maintenance for profit of a street railway upon such
highways is surely not an essential governmental function, within Col-
lector v. Day. In. City of Seattle v. Poe (1925, W. D. Wash.) 4 Fed. (2d)
276, arising in the circuit in which U. S. v. King Co. was decided, the
court distinguished the operation of a ferry from the operation of a street
railway on this basis, and held that the collection of the federal income
tax from the employees of the Seattle municipal street railway would
not be enjoined. See also discussions of Frey v. Woodworth, disapproving
its conclusions in (1925) 25 COL. L. Rav. 653, note, and (1925) 38 IARV.
L. RM. 793.
See also Lyons v. Reinecke, supra note 1, holding that the federal income
tax exacted for 1920 on compensation received for expert real estate
appraisal services rendered to the Chicago Board of Local Improvements
and paid out of the proceeds of city bonds could not be recovered by the
taxpayer.
53 Supra, note 52.
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operated gasolene station would be subject to the tax. It would
be easier to define this category than any other suggested, and if
the premise is accepted that the exemptions of the salaries of
state officials, being unfortunate in any case, should be restricted
as far as possible, a conclusion in favor of this division follows.
On the other hand, courts may be persuaded to add in effect to
the customary two categories of governmental and proprietary
activities a third classification of businesses affected with a pub-
lic interest, and to hold that the compensation of the officers or
employees of one of these businesses, if state-operated, is exempt
from federal tax54 In view of the prospective or actual ventures
of states and cities into the ownership and operation of street
railways, water-works, gas plants, housing projects, workmen's
compensation insurance funds, grain elevators and so on, this
latter conclusion will sooner or later noticeably affect the national
revenues from the income tax, and may even lead to a demand
for the abolition of the tax, on the ground of the inequalities in
its incidence. In any event, the decisions as to the scope of this
implied exemption, originating in Collector v,. Day, and unfortu-
nately not set at rest by the Sixteenth Amendment, will be among
the most important in this field of law.
Z4 Blessrs. Cohen and Dayton apparently advocate some such distinction
as this; they urge that the exercise or the grant of the power of eminent
domain furnishes an analogy for the grant of an exemption from taxation.
See op. cit. supra note 2 at 822-5. Cf., however, the quotation from FPin
v. Stone-Tracy Co., supra, p. 963.
